Florida courts use the extraordinary remedy of imposing temporary injunctions only sparingly, and grant temporary injunctions only when the allegations proof of the facts support the entry of this relief.  

“A party seeking a temporary injunction must prove: (1) that it will suffer irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public interest.” Jouvence Ctr.…

The traditional standards for imposing injunctions or freeze orders apply in trust litigation matters.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal’s opinion in McKeegan v. Ernst, 84 So.3d 1229 (Fla. 4thDCA 2012) was one of the first decisions along these lines.  In McKeegan, Ms. McKeegan challenged the entry of an ex parte temporary injunction order imposed on a trust bank account.  Ms. McKeegan argued that the temporary injunction order was facially deficient because it did not include sufficient factual findings to support each prong of the four-part injunction test….

The Second District Court of Appeal’s opinion in Ebeling v. Ebeling (June 7, 2019) reiterated this concept of trust construction.

In Ebeling, the trial court construed the terms of a trust to determine the entitlement to the trust’s assets.  The trial court’s decision on distribution to contingent beneficiaries named in the trust rater than the decedent’s estate was reversed.

The trust was governed by Illinois law but that did not make any difference. …

In the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s recent opinion in Mullins v. Mullins, June 7, 2019, the court reversed the probate court’s decision, holding that a will established the interest in the real property and not a homestead order from the probate court.

The will that was admitted to probate in this case devised the decedent’s property to her three children, giving a life estate to her two sons.  Subsequently the probate court entered a homestead order, reflecting that the property was devised in equal shares to the decedent’s three children, but the order did not mention the life estate interest of the two sons. …

The question of whether ashes of a deceased person can be divided comes up often among family members, distraught over the loss of a loved one, and particularly in modern day family situations with divorced parents and blended families.

This question was answered in 2014 in the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s opinion in Wilson v. Wilson, 138 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 4thDCA 2014).  Ashes are not property as defined by Fla. Stat. 731.201(32) and thus not subject to partitioning or division….

Florida Statute 732.7025, effective July 1, 2018, set forth language to include in a deed for a spouse to waive his or her Florida homestead rights:

Section 732.7025(1) provides the following language: “By executing or joining this deed, I intend to waive homestead rights that would otherwise prevent my spouse from devising the homestead property described in this deed to someone other than me.”

This is not a waiver of other protections. Subsection (2) sets these out: “The waiver language in subsection (1) may not be considered a waiver of the protection against the owner’s creditor claims during the owner’s lifetime and after death. …

The recent Third District Court of Appeal opinion in Lee v. Lee, (Fla. 3d DCA January 23, 2019), addressed the question of whether a legal description for a disclaimer of real estate is required on a disclaimer.  The short answer to this question is that a disclaimer of real estate is valid without a legal description of the property, if it not to be recorded for purposes of providing constructive notice to one doing a title search for the property….

Rule 9.170 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure provides a non-exclusive list of the types of orders that can be appealed from in probate cases. This Rule was recently examined by the Third District Court of Appeal, in the decision made in Maercks v. Maercks, on April 3, 2019.

In Maercks, the decedent executed a will that was admitted to probate.  She also executed a second document regarding distribution of her assets. …

The Third District Court of Appeal’s recent opinion in Sibley v. Estate of Sibley, — So. 3d —, 2019 WL 1461325 (Fla. 3d DCA April 3, 2019) reminds us that a testator’s or settlor’s intent is to be given paramount deference in constructing the language of a testamentary document.

In Sibley, Charles Sibley, the trustee, appellant, and brother of the decedent, appealed the trial court’s order determining, inter alia, that the foundation-beneficiary of the trust was “not in existence” at the time of the decedent’s death. …

The Fourth District Court of Appeal’s recent opinion in Cohen v. Scarnato, issued April 10, 2019, has us again rethinking the appropriate venue in which to bring a trust dispute action.

Florida Statute 47.122 provides that “[f]or the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice, any court of record may transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought.”  If seeking a transfer of venue under this section, and as explained by the Cohencourt, affidavits or other evidence are necessary to demonstrate the necessity for change of venue based on the statutory factors of convenience of the parties or witnesses or the interest of justice….